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Forest carbon is potentially an important income stream for small land owners in 
Guatemala that would help to cease deforestation and forest degradation pressures. 
However, the temporary nature of sequestered forest carbon, the risk of 
environmental disturbances releasing forest sequestered carbon, and the form of 
international carbon markets affect the ability of small forest owners to participate 
in carbon trading schemes. This paper reports the results of an investigation into 
the stability of carbon pools formed by small forest owners in Guatemala, 
accounting for forest fire risk and the effects on implementation of a carbon 
banking approach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Forest ecosystems have a great significance for dealing with climate change as 
they help to sequester carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and regulate climate 
(Chenost et al., 2010; Seeberg-Elverfeldt, 2010).  As a result, carbon sequestration 
through forestry or agro-forestry activities has been discussed as an alternative not 
only for reducing CO2 from the atmosphere, but also as a stream of revenue for 
forest holders (Skole et al., 2009).   
This could be significant for Guatemala with 35.5% of its territory under forest 
coverage (UVG et al., 2011) and around 43.4% of that in small forests (Estrategia 
de la Subsecretaría de Política Agraria, 2005).  Small forest owners who sequester 
carbon from the atmosphere face some constraints to their participation in 
international carbon markets. These include; a) market exclusion as the 
international regulatory framework requires projects with large land forest cover 
(Milder et al., 2010), b) high transaction costs when demonstrating carbon 
sequestration levels (De Pinto et al., 2010; Beddoe, 2010; Cacho et al., 2005a; 
Pfaff, et al., 2007; Galik et al., 2009), c) lack of access to carbon market 
information, c) lack of technical assistance (Roncoli et al., 2007), and d) the risk 
of environmental disturbances such as forest fire, floods, and storms which can 
release forest sequestered carbon into the atmosphere (Feng et al., 2002; Chomitz 
& Lecocq, 2003; Skutsch & Trines, 2010).   
One way to overcome these hurdles is carbon banking (Bigsby, 2009). This 
approach uses intermediary financial institutions to aggregate carbon credits from 
small owners and to package them for buyers who are unwilling to accept the 
additional risks and costs associated with sourcing carbon credits stemming from 
small owners individually (Bigsby, 2009; Milder et al., 2010).  This paper 
addresses risk from forest fire, modelled by applying Monte Carlo simulation to 
show the potential leasable carbon storage after accounting for risk, as well as to 
demonstrate how this risk affects prices paid to small forest owners.  
Theoretical Framework 
Carbon Banking 
Carbon banking creates a carbon market and works like a financial institution 
(bank) in which sequestered carbon, not cash, is the medium of exchange.  The 
system can work with emission reductions schemes that are both permanent and 
temporary. Financial institution services include deposits, renting or leasing and 
withdrawals.  For instance, from the supply side, carbon sequestered in forestry or 
agro-forestry systems can be deposited in the bank.  The capital is just rented, not 
purchased, and hence the use of interest rental payments for the use of capital 
carbon is implemented.  The approach’s flexibility allows that any carbon 
sequester who would decide to make the deposit would also have the chance to 
withdraw their carbon credits at any time (Esuola & Weersink, 2006; Bigsby, 
2009).   
The carbon bank registers the carbon deposited for a certain period of time.  The 
initial carbon deposit is certified by a baseline carbon study and subsequent 
procedures are required to monitor changes on carbon stock through applying 
carbon accounting systems (Bigsby, 2009a).  Nevertheless, carbon deposits might 
be withdrawn for a variety of reasons.  Firstly, depositors can find better and more 
profitable alternative uses of their assets (forest land).  Secondly, they can use 
their carbon credits to meet their own emission reductions obligations. Further, 
current carbon markets may be affected by the uncertainties of international 
policies on GHG emissions surrounding the Post Kyoto-2012 agreement which 
might change carbon prices (Esuola & Weersink, 2006; Linacre et al., 2011, p. 
47).  Finally, withdrawals may also occur due to net harvest reductions (rotation 
length, stocking and harvesting intensity) as well as unexpected events, such as 
environmental disasters through forest fires, pests, storms, wind throws, 
landslides, hail, floods and droughts (Bigsby, 2009a; Bigsby, 2009b; MARN et 
al., 2009).  
The carbon rental approach and temporary crediting of carbon storage have arisen 
to allow entities with emission reductions obligations to defer some obligations 
for a certain period of time (Marland et al., 2001; Sedjo & Marland, 2003). The 
main characteristic of a rental system is that it behaves like a direct credit-debit 
system for the renter of credits.  For instance, credit is assigned when carbon is 
sequestered and debits are accrued when carbon is emitted.  At the end of the 
rental period, the renter will have received some of the benefits and can decide 
either to renew the lease elsewhere or incur the emission debit and replace the 
credit with one from another activity (Sedjo & Marland, 2003; Marland et al., 
2001).  
Figure 1 depicts the main interactions amongst small owners, bank and carbon 
buyers/borrowers.  
Figure 1.  Carbon banking  
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 Model  
In order to complement the theoretical framework described above, this section 
will outline and itemise the mathematical model used to analyse carbon banking 
in Guatemala, accounting for forest fire risk.   
Carbon banking empirical approach: measured variables  
The variables used to set up an empirical carbon banking approach are:  
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Therefore, the three mathematical formulas are 
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1
PFi  is determined by the bank’s attitude to risk through Monte Carlo simulation at 95
th
 percentile, 
given by 1 – 95th percentile value 
2
 See appendix  X  for calculation details  
3
 The bank incurs administrative fixed costs such as; a) costs of designing and implementing a 
monitoring plan
3
, b) costs of monitoring verification by a third party, c) contracts between bank-
buyer, and bank-small landowners, and d) experts needed to implement carbon banking (Antinori 
and Sathaye, 2007) 
4
 Cost per contract between smallholder and bank, number of smallholders and percentage of 
participation of smallholder. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
 Methods 
Method for analysing risk 
Monte Carlo simulation was used for risk analysis.  Monte Carlo analysis 
provides significant insight into problems involving uncertainty by repeatedly 
randomly sampling probabilistic data to generate probability distributions for 
outcomes of interest (Rose et al., 1989; Vose, 2000). Monte-Carlo has already 
proven to be a very useful technique for examining the effects of uncertainties 
derived from the incidence of forest fires upon an ecosystem (Carmel et al., 2009; 
Conedera et al., 2011). 
Historical forest fire data were obtained and distributions fitted to the data 
(Palisade Corporation, 2010).  The best fitting probability distribution function 
was identified using a Chi-square test (Law & Kelton, 1982; Palisade 
Corporation, 2010; Vose, 2000).  All these calculations were undertaken using 
@Risk software, a Microsoft Excel add-in.  In addition, sensitivity analysis was 
also used as it is useful for testing sensitivity in inputs such as costs and receipts 
when analysing investment performances (Rose, et al., 1989). Sensitivity was 
carried out considering factors such as fixed costs, level of participation of small 
owners in the bank scheme, and bank profit rates. So, three scenarios were set to 
estimate how sensitive fixed costs are on the level of participation of small forest 
owners, profit margin rate as well as on the maximum payable to small forest 
owners.  These calculations were also undertaken by using Microsoft Excel.  
Data  
To simplify data analysis information was categorised at the national level 
considering the Holdridge Life Zones System (De La Cruz, 1982).  Three zones
5
 
were defined; 1) Wet and moist, 2) Montane, and 3) Dry.  
Data collection  
The most reliable secondary data sources were used wherever possible, such as 
published data and official statistics. The following criteria were applied to assure 
the quality of data: a) original purpose of the data collection, whether the 
document is produced for the government, a corporate or for marketing purposes, 
b) well-known authors, c) methods well-designed, d) date of publication, and e) 
document has to be well-referenced using official data (Atkinson and Brandolini, 
2001). In cases where information did not fulfil these criteria, and data were 
unavailable, expert knowledge was used. This was obtained by direct personal 
contact via email or interview with relevant experts.   
                                                          
5
 Zone classifications used in this research are not official Guatemalan ecosystem classifications.  
 Results and Discussion 
Table 1.  Results of the Carbon banking model assuming 100% of participation 
of small forest owner into the carbon bank. 
 
 
To model forest fire, the proportion of forest area burned annually over the last 
ten years was used in each of the three zones. As a proxy for the proportion of 
forest carbon available for renting out to carbon market, a strong risk-averse 
position was assumed for the bank, requiring coverage of the 95
th
 percentile of 
forest fire loss. Results are reported in Table 1 and risk distribution functions 
arising from forest fire occurrence for each zone are reported in the appendices 1, 
2 and 3.  The results demonstrate that from 4.87M tCO2e deposited in the bank 
potentially available for contract between banks and small landowners in the Wet 
Zone, only 96.35% of it can be available for the bank to rent out to companies 
who have carbon liabilities when adjusted for fire risk. It means that there is an 
annual withdrawal of 3.65% of carbon due to forest fire.  The carbon availability 
is also shown for the Montane Zone with 98.87% and for the Dry Zone 97.13%.  
This risk-adjusted forest carbon is the total size of the potential carbon pool 
available from small landowners to put into international carbon markets.  
 
These results are surprising because environmental conditions make the dry zone 
highly susceptible to fire (Cochrane, 2003) but the Guatemalan case shows 
otherwise.  According to the last State of the Environment Report (MARN et al., 
2009) the main forest fire driver in the Wet and Moist Zone is encroachment, 
which is promoted for agricultural development. Also the lack of sound 
governance in this Zone may facilitate money laundering from drug smugglers, 
Zones
Area of forest 
land in zone i 
deposited in the 
bank (ha)
Volumen of 
carbon deposited 
from zone i 
(tCO2e)
Risk-adjusted carbon 
available for lease 
from zone i  (% )
Bank annual 
carbon rental 
revenue in zone 
i  (USD)
C PFi I
Dry 1,454.94 37,807.42 97.13% 8,629.46
Montane 7,593.67 1,494,996.42 98.87% 354,742.55
Wet and moist 26,100.12 4,876,684.30 96.35% 1,127,703.39
TOTAL 35,148.73 6,409,488.14 1,491,259.00
promoting a land black market in which slash and burn is used to establish large 
extensions of livestock farms.  
 
In terms of bank annual income derived from leasing forest carbon are listed in 
the table 1.  The highest annual revenue is shown in the Wet and Moist zone with 
USD 1.12 m as it possesses the highest risk-adjusted carbon available for renting 
out, followed by the Montane zone with USD 0.354 m and the Dry one with USD 
0.0862 m.  Bank income may change if annual carbon rental (ACR) value does. 
The variables related to ACR are interest rates and carbon price in international 
carbon markets.  The driver of change for interest rates is market-driven and it 
relies on economic and financial national policies and for carbon price is 
classically influenced by the balance of demand and supply of carbon credits at 
international level (Chevallier, 2011).  Thus, the increasing of ACR is associated 
to the rise of carbon prices and interest rates.    
 
On the other hand, variables such as the level of participation of small owners into 
the carbon bank scheme, fixed costs, and bank profit rate influence the maximum 
payment the bank could pay to small owners for retaining their forest and 
sequester carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. The table 2, 3, and 4 show a 
sensitivity analysis to demonstrate different carbon payment options through three 
scenarios indicating changes in such variables.   
 
Table 2.  Scenario 1 with maximum payable (USD/ tCO2e/yr) to small forest 
owners based on % of participation of small owners and bank profits margins with 
USD 1.163 m of fixed costs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.  Scenario 2 with maximum payable (USD/ tCO2e/yr) to small forest 
owners based on % of participation of small owners and bank profits margins with 
25% less USD 0.872 m of fixed costs 
 
 
 
T
a
b
l
0.00% 5.00% 10.00% 15.00% 20.00% 25.00%
100% 0.053 0.041 0.029 0.017 0.006 -0.006
90% 0.032 0.021 0.009 -0.003 -0.015 -0.026
80% 0.007 -0.004 -0.016 -0.028 -0.040 -0.052
70% -0.025 -0.037 -0.049 -0.060 -0.072 -0.084
Minimum % of profit margin for the bank
% 
landowners 
in the 
scheme 
0.00% 5.00% 10.00% 15.00% 20.00% 25.00% 30.00% 40.00% 50.00%
100% 0.098 0.086 0.074 0.063 0.051 0.039 0.027 0.004 -0.020
90% 0.083 0.071 0.059 0.048 0.036 0.024 0.012 -0.011 -0.035
80% 0.064 0.052 0.040 0.029 0.017 0.005 -0.007 -0.030 -0.054
70% 0.040 0.028 0.016 0.004 -0.007 -0.019 -0.031 -0.054 -0.078
60% 0.007 -0.004 -0.016 -0.028 -0.040 -0.052 -0.063 -0.087 -0.110
50% -0.038 -0.050 -0.062 -0.073 -0.085 -0.097 -0.109 -0.132 -0.156
% 
landowners 
in the 
scheme 
Minimum % of profit margin for the bank
e 3.  Scenario 3 with maximum payable (USD/ tCO2e/yr) to small forest owners 
based on % of participation of small owners and bank profits margins with 50% 
less USD 0.581 m of fixed cost 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As can be seen from the table 2, 3 and 4 maximum payable prices vary according 
to the level of participation of small forest owners, the level of the bank’s profit 
rates as well as to fixed costs.   
 
The results show maximum amounts at which the bank could afford to pay when 
renting out forest carbon.  From scenario 1, with 0% minimum profit margin of 
capital 80% of landowners in the carbon banking scheme need to deposit their 
carbon before the bank can pay landowners USD 0.05/tCO2e/yr  for their carbon 
deposits. Any percentage less than 80% of landowners in the scheme will show 
that the carbon banking system will not make profit from leasing forest carbon. 
With 5% of minimum profit margin the bank could afford to pay USD 0.041/ 
tCO2e/yr, with 20% will be USD 0.006/ tCO2e and after 20% profit margin, the 
bank will not pay anything to small owners as it does not generate income to pay 
off forest carbon.  From scenario 1 to 2, if fixed costs are reduced at 25%, 
maximum payment to small owners rise USD 0.050/tCO2e/yr rented and at least 
60% of small owners have to be into the carbon banking system with their forest 
carbon.  In scenario 2, bank profit rate reveals that the bank could set up a profit 
margin over 20% if there are at least 90% of small owners involved in the carbon 
bank.  
 
The scenario 3 demonstrates that a minimum of 40% of small owners require to 
deposit their forest carbon in the bank before the bank can pay USD 
0.005/tCO2e/yr to small owners.  However, there is not any profit margin when 
bank pays USD 0.005/tCO2e/yr.  In this scenario, the bank may increase their 
profit margin up to 30%, but it needs to have into the carbon bank 60% of small 
owners in order to pay a maximum of USD 0.12/tCO2e/yr and if 100% of small 
owners are involved in the scheme, the maximum payment rise up to USD 
0.073/tCO2e/yr.  
 
Considering the above empirical results and discussion, it is worthwhile to 
mention that this analysis needs to address some issues in order to enhance the 
carbon bank performance.  Firstly, the forest carbon property rights have to be 
defined (Bigsby, 2009) when small landowners do not have land titles, when their 
land is under communal arrangement, and if they are leasing land from the State. 
0.00% 5.00% 10.00% 15.00% 20.00% 25.00% 30.00% 40.00% 50.00%
100% 0.143 0.132 0.120 0.108 0.096 0.085 0.073 0.049 0.026
90% 0.133 0.122 0.110 0.098 0.086 0.074 0.063 0.039 0.016
80% 0.121 0.109 0.097 0.085 0.074 0.062 0.050 0.027 0.003
70% 0.104 0.093 0.081 0.069 0.057 0.046 0.034 0.010 -0.013
60% 0.083 0.071 0.059 0.048 0.036 0.024 0.012 -0.011 -0.035
50% 0.053 0.041 0.029 0.017 0.006 -0.006 -0.018 -0.041 -0.065
40% 0.007 -0.004 -0.016 -0.028 -0.040 -0.052 -0.063 -0.087 -0.110
30% -0.068 -0.080 -0.092 -0.104 -0.115 -0.127 -0.139 -0.162 -0.186
Minimum % of profit margin for the bank
% 
landowners 
in the 
scheme 
Property rights in forest carbon under such situations are still under legal and 
political discussions in Guatemala.  Secondly, costs of designing and 
implementing monitoring plan should be assessed as it might be possible to create 
a new monitoring methodology. Also, costs of verification, setting up contracts 
and negotiation costs have to be analysed by drawing up a cash flow with its 
internal rates of return (IRR) and net present value (NPV).  This may be useful 
when analysing possible profitable economic alternatives. In addition, the type of 
market that would ease rental of carbon is an essential step to start making forest 
carbon transaction either at national or international level.  Finally, the level of 
participation of small landowners into the carbon bank would be a financial and 
political consideration when starting negotiation on launching a carbon bank 
project in Guatemala.  This is a sensitive issue as many small landowners either 
are not well-organised or the ones with institutional organisation do not have a 
proper level of education to understand the context of carbon banking approach. 
Conclusions 
The aim of this study was to estimate the effective forest carbon pool availability 
for renting out to companies with carbon commitments accounting biophysical 
risk such as forest fire, and to identify how maximum payments to small forest 
owners are affected when considering fire risk, level of participation of small 
forest owners, bank profit margins and fixed costs.  The stochastic analysis shows 
that for the three zones more than 96% of forest carbon from the maximum 
volume of carbon deposited in the bank can be available for leasing in carbon 
markets when adjusted for fire risk.  The results arising from sensitivity analysis 
demonstrates that factors such level of participation of small forest owners, forest 
fire risk and bank profits rates are factors affecting the threshold of payment that 
bank could afford to small forest owner to keep forest stand and capture carbon 
dioxide.  Thus, the higher profit margins are the high level of involvement from 
small forest owner into the carbon banking system is required.  The scenario 
which fits the best is No. 3 where fixed costs were reduced at 50%, and the bank 
needs at least 50% of small owners’ forest carbon; therefore, its profit margins 
may reach up to 50%.  At this stage, the maximum payable to small owners will 
be only USD 0.26/tCO2e/yr. 
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Appendix 1.  Monte Carlo simulation on forest fires in the Dry Zone 
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Appendix 2. Monte Carlo simulation on forest fires in the Montane Zone 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3.  Monte Carlo simulation on forest fires in the Wet and Moist Zone 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Units at one 
fixed-year
4.80
4.90%
Annual carbon rental value 0.24
6,734
Capital value for carbon
Interest rate in Guatemala
Total of small forest onwers 
willing to maintain their forest
based on the carbon rental 
formula
Variables Descripcion
based on the international carbon 
price at ECX (USD)
market interest rate at fixed-term 
365 days (%)
Number of small landholders
Fixed costs 
Operational costs Type of cost Units
Cost per unit  
(USD)
Total cost 
(USD)
3 carbon management experts 3 40,000.00 120,000.00
Brokerage system 1 900,000.00 900,000.00
Monitoring Plan Consultancy fee 1 20,000.00 20,000.00
Monitoring at field level Adminstrative fee 1 75,000.00 75,000.00
Verification of monitoring developed by third party Auditor fee 1 45,000.00 45,000.00
Administrative costs
First ERPA (Emission Reduction Purchase 
Agreement) Bank-buyer 
Consultancy fee 1 2,250.00 2,250.00
First contract Small forest owner-Bank Administrative fee 1 750.00 750.00
Subtotal 1,163,000.00
Variable costs
Variable cost per land owner
Other associated costs when issuing one contract 
(energy, printers, paper, etc)
Administrative fee 6,734 1.00 6,734.00
6,734.00
Total costs 1,169,734.00
Subtotal 
Appendix 4. Annual carbon rental variable and its value 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 5. Costs for managing small landowners’ accounts and costs for managing one ton of carbon  
 
 
 
